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Abstract
This article provides a new methodology to predict conflict by using
newspaper text. Through machine learning, vast quantities of newspa-
per text are reduced to interpretable topic shares. We use changes in
topic shares to predict conflict one and two years before it occurs. In
our predictions we distinguish between predicting the likelihood of con-
flict across countries and the timing of conflict within each country. Most
factors identified by the literature, though performing well at predicting
the location of conflict, add little to the prediction of timing. We show
that news topics indeed can predict the timing of conflict onset. We also
use the estimated topic shares to document how reporting changes before
conflict breaks out.
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1 Introduction
The conflict literature has made significant progress in understanding which
countries are more at risk of suffering from armed conflict.1 However, many
factors that have been identified as leading to increased risk, like mountainous
terrain or ethnic polarization, are time invariant or very slow-moving and there-
fore not useful in predicting the timing of conflict. Other factors, like GDP levels
or political institutions, still vary more between countries than within countries
over time. It is easier to predict whether a country is at risk in general rather
than when a country is particularly at risk.
An additional problem in forecasting the timing of armed conflict is that it
is rare and at the same time relatively concentrated in some countries. Imagine
that at the end of the second world war one had attributed a prediction of
conflict to all years in some countries and the prediction of no conflict to all
years of the remaining countries. This forecast would have been able to reach
a striking level of accuracy of over 90 percent. However, such a model would
be completely time invariant and, hence, tell us nothing about the timing of
conflict.
This is problematic because it implies that the variation between countries
can dominate the analysis unless the between and within variation are separated
explicitly. Empirical models that are overall quite accurate can therefore be
nonetheless of little use on the time dimension. We show, using a simple panel
regression model, that many variables commonly used in the literature indeed
face this problem.2 Yet, policymakers and academics alike might be interested in
a measure of conflict risk that is meaningful on the time dimension and performs
well out-of-sample.
As a solution to this problem we propose data generated from news sources.3
News content has strong country-specific elements and is available in real time
- both of these elements give it a comparative advantage in predicting the time-
dimension of conflict. At the same time, journalists are not merely neutral
observers. They curate facts and connect them to build an overall impression of
a situation. In this regard their work is similar to the work of country experts
working for governments. Summarizing this expert opinion in a quantifiable
measure could therefore add forecasting power which goes beyond the available
data and even other methods of summarizing text.
To this end, we propose a new, fully automated, method to quantify the
content of news using the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model (Blei, Ng and
Jordan 2003), which we apply to over 700,000 newspaper articles from English-
speaking newspapers. We show that it is possible to summarize news text in a
1See, for example, Goldstone et al. (2010), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Esteban, Mayoral
and Ray (2012), Besley and Persson (2011a). See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a summary
of the literature.
2Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010) demonstrate that focusing on statistically significant
relationships does not necessarily contribute to the prediction of conflict. However, they do
not emphasize that many of these significant relationships suffer from a lack of time variation.
3We are not the first to propose news sources to forecast conflict. See, for example, Chade-
faux (2014) and Ward et al. (2013), which we discuss in detail below.
2
meaningful way in a topic model. More surprisingly, perhaps, the topics which
summarize the text are able to forecast conflict across countries and decades.
Moreover, we demonstrate that writing on specific topics consistently increases,
while other topics disappear before conflict. The result is a model which can
even forecast the onset of armed conflict, an event of much lower intensity, a
year before it occurs. Furthermore, the procedure can be implemented with only
minimal personal judgement and appears to generate consistent summaries of
text, which could be used in other applications as well.
Our empirical methodology proceeds in three steps. We first download news-
paper articles from LexisNexis and collect words and series of words, referred
to as tokens, in one vector for each article. Newspaper articles offer several
advantages for the analysis of conflict. They stretch several decades and report
on events in all countries, which means that even rare events are sufficiently
common to be analyzed with quantitative methods. Also, newspapers provide
a high degree of consistency regarding the density of news per year that can be
reported. This makes token counts at least somewhat comparable across years
and even decades. We downloaded all articles on 185 countries from the New
York Times, the Washington Post, and the Economist for all available years
since 1980. This gives us a basis of 700,000 newspaper articles with a little less
than one million unique word combinations, even after excluding stop words,
rare words and stemming.
As a second step, we develop a topic model tailored for the purpose of
summarizing the content of news reports in a country and year. We use the
LDA model to generate quantitative summaries of the articles. In this way, the
high dimensionality of token vectors (0.9 Million) can be decreased to as many
topics as we choose. The main advantage of this methodology is that we do not
need to impose any prior on which part of the text is important when predicting
conflict - we can let the data speak.
As the final step, we use the emergence and disappearance of topics on the
country level to predict conflict out-of-sample. For this step, we calculate the
share of words written on each topic in every country and year. We then use
these topic shares to predict conflict in the following year. We show that the
timing of conflict can be predicted out-of-sample with changes in topic shares.
The work conducted by journalists can be used in this way to provide a new
quantitative measure of country risks.
We use our estimated models to simulate the problem of a policy maker who
attributes costs to false positives and false negatives when forecasting conflict.
This view reveals that a model, which is geared towards predicting the timing
of conflict, produces a very different perspective on the forecasting problem.
The main advantage of using time-varying measures of risk is that one has a
higher chance of anticipating conflicts which break out in formerly fairly peaceful
countries, like Egypt or Libya. Another, perhaps less obvious, advantage of using
time-varying risk measures is that previously violent countries which stabilize
do not generate false positives.
We argue that there are two dimensions to the ability of topic models to
predict the onset of armed conflict. First, since topics are a collection of words
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that co-occur, the model is valid across countries and time. Insurgencies, for
example, will trigger certain keywords that are shared across all countries and
time even if the specific context differs. Second, the model uses positive and
negative associations with conflict to predict onset. We find, for example, that
news which describe judicial procedures systematically decrease when conflict
risk increases. We also use our estimates of the content of articles to show that
our predictions are driven by large changes in the content of some articles rather
than subtle changes in many articles.
We proceed as follows. We first discuss related literature in Section 2. In
Section 3 we argue that standard linear fixed effects regressions can be used
to distinguish between location and timing in forecasting. In Section 4 we
present our methodology of aggregating news text into topics and the forecasting
method. Section 5 presents the main results, while in Section 6 we discuss policy
implications. In Section 7 we investigate the content of topics and its relation
to conflict prediction. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The academic literature has made large strides towards understanding the trig-
gers of civil conflict. A part of the literature has focused on establishing links
to specific factors like ethnic cleavages (Reynal-Querol and Montalvo 2005, Es-
teban, Mayoral and Ray 2012, Caselli and Coleman 2013), climate (Miguel,
Satyanath and Sergenti 2004, Dell, Jones and Olken 2012) or natural resources
(Bru¨ckner and Ciccone 2010, Bazzi and Blattman 2014). This literature is more
concerned with identification and less with forecasting power. Another part of
the literature has looked at using a mix of political and economics variables
to explain conflict. Examples are Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoef-
fler (2004), Collier et al. (2009), Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010), or Besley and
Persson (2011a). For a review of this literature see Blattman and Miguel (2010).
Most recently, attention has shifted towards forecasting armed conflict with
variables used by this literature. Rost, Schneider and Kleibl (2009) use cross-
sectional logit regressions on economic and political variables as well as proxies
for violations of human rights to predict conflict onset within a 5-year window.
They find substantial predictive power of their model within this time-frame.
Goldstone et al. (2010) provide predictions of political instability at the coun-
try level within a two-year horizon. Their statistical method compares coun-
try/years before instability to country/years in the same region that were not
followed by onset. Their main finding is that the best predictors of instability
are slow-moving variables like political institutions or infant mortality. Hegre
et al. (2013) forecast conflict for the period 2010-2050 using a combination of
variables like population, infant mortality and education.4 Ward et al. (2013)
use a combination of event data and more standard variables to make monthly
4The intriguing point in such a long-term forecast is that the timing of conflict is less
important so that the standard framework seems quite adequate.
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predictions up to six months ahead. Their model has a striking degree of accu-
racy in predicting civil war onset and performs well out-of-sample. They also
discuss the purpose of forecasting and argue for out-of-sample prediction as a
possible gold standard of model development in the field of conflict studies.
Chadefaux (2014) relies on keyword counts of a list of predetermined words to
construct an index of tension on a weekly basis for the period 1902 to 2001.
He uses the constructed tension data to predict onset of conflict weeks before
it occurs and shows that news data can contribute significantly to a standard
model.
We add to this forecasting literature in three ways. First, we provide a novel
way to summarize news in few dimensions, which we see as complementary to the
existing event data and word counts. The summaries we generate do not use any
prior assumption on the words that could predict conflict, i.e. our predictions
use almost the entire newspaper text written on each country. Secondly, an
important conceptual contribution of this project is that we build a forecasting
models which allows us to focus on within-country variation. In other words, we
explicitly focus on predicting the timing of violence out-of-sample. This is an
important distinction to most existing studies.5 Thirdly, we attempt to predict
conflict with news data up to two years before conflict occurs. The longer time
period compared to other studies which use news provides a longer period to
react to early warning.
Another part of the literature has tried to predict conflict locations within
ongoing conflicts. Here the problem of predicting timing is alleviated as it is
already clear that the baseline-conflict risk is fairly high. Research can therefore
focus on distinguishing the determinants of risk in the cross-section. Blair,
Blattman and Hartman (2014) use 56 risk factors to predict locations of conflict
within Liberia. They find that especially ethnic diversity and polarization, two
slow-moving variables, consistently predict the location of violence over time.
Similarly, Schutte (2014) predicts location of conflict using structural factors
like population or the distance to the capital. An interesting exception are
studies which predict the timing of local violence using violence in neighbouring
geographic units. Weidmann and Ward (2010), for example, show that a reliable
predictor of violence in a given period is violence in near regions in the previous
period.
The topic model has been used by Quinn et al. (2010) to categorize over
100,000 speeches in the US congress. They estimate a topic model of 42 topics to
show that topics can be used to analyze democratic agenda dynamics over a long
time period. Topics have also been used by Hansen, McMahon and Prat (2014)
to quantify discussions in the central bank committee of the Bank of England.
The approach has the big advantage of requiring no human input except for
the choice of two distribution parameters. We contribute to this literature
by applying the topic model to newspaper text and by using the estimated
5Ward et al. (2013) use country as a group variable in their logit framework. This is similar
to country fixed effects but it means that countries, which are always peaceful or always in
conflict in the sample period, get dropped from the sample. This is particularly important as
sudden outbreaks of civil war in a previously peaceful country cannot be predicted.
5
topic shares in cross-country panels. We show that topics form around useful
categories such as “conflict”, “economics”, “sports”, “tourism” and “justice”
and, perhaps most surprisingly, that re-estimation of the topic model across
years preserves these categories to a large extent. However, within our method,
the approach we use is the simplest possible. It would, for example, be possible
to use a structural topic model as suggested by Roberts et al. (2013), in which
covariates are embedded in the topic generation. The appeal of the method
we choose here is that it is fully automatic except for the choice of number of
topics and two additional parameters. We are not imposing a prior regarding
the structure of the text.
News sources have previously been used to generate data on expectations
and perceptions. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) use the frequency of the United
Nations and the Security Council being mentioned in the New York Times as
a proxy for its political importance. Ramey (2011) shows that increases in mil-
itary spending can be predicted through news reports several quarters before
they occur. Bru¨ckner and Pappa (2015) show that news on the Olympic Games,
not the Games themselves, drive investment in countries that host them. Baker,
Bloom and Davis (2015) show that word combinations such as “economic un-
certainty congress” can be used to measure political uncertainty. The approach
chosen in these studies is possible because there is a clear prior regarding which
news reports should capture perceptions. An exception in this literature is
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), who develop a measure of political bias of news-
paper outlets in the US. To do this, they generate a list of expressions that
indicate Republican or Democratic slant. They generate this list by looking at
what expressions distinguish political speeches by Republicans and Democrats.
Our methodology follows this basic idea but instead tries to understand how
news text changes in the years before political instability compared to other
years.
An important issue of concern, is that news data has been criticised as a
source of data. For example, Woolley (2000) discusses several issues related
to using newspaper data. He criticises the use of counts in environments with
widely varying news volumes and recommends deflating counts. Weidmann
(2016) shows forcefully that media coverage can lead to a bias in reporting. He
demonstrates that this is a problem if conflict data is used to study the effect
of media access. Indeed, as in most other studies of conflict, our left-hand-side
variable is based on an event count which is partly informed by news agencies.
We address this concern by looking at topic shares on the right-hand-side, which
means we deflate the right-hand-side news data. Our predictors rely on content
rather than quantity of reporting. In addition, we add country fixed effects,
which controls for reporting biases at the country level. We show that changes
in content can predict changes in reported counts out-of-sample. Moreover, in
order to illustrate that we are not merely picking up news biases, we also show
that we can predict refugee movements, which are collected and reported by
local agents directly to the UNHCR.
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3 Forecasting the Timing of Conflict
In this section, we show that the main difficulty of forecasting conflict lies in
forecasting the timing. We show this in two steps. First, we argue that sep-
arating the variation between countries from the variation within a country is
essential to understanding the timing of conflict. We then use a linear fixed
effects model to study three empirical models of conflict suggested in the lit-
erature. This reveals huge differences in their ability to forecast the between
and within variation in conflict onset. By far most explanatory power in most
models comes from the fixed effects. Predicting the timing of the onset of armed
conflict is particularly difficult.
3.1 The Time Dimension of Conflict
Our aim is to train our model to forecast by comparing observations in country
i and year t that were followed by conflict within one or two years (treatment)
to observations which did not experience conflict later (control). One way to
do this is by regressing a dummy yit that indicates one year before conflict on
a set of country characteristics ~xit.
6 The most standard way to do this is the
logit model, which has the formal representation
Pr(yit = 1) = F (α+ ~xit~β) (1)
where Pr(yit = 1) is the probability of observing conflict within the next year
and F is the cumulative logistic distribution. Less common is the linear proba-
bility model (LPM) which takes the form
yit = α+ ~xit~β + εit. (2)
There are several problems associated with this model and a broad academic de-
bate has brought pro- and counter-arguments for its adoption.7 We nonetheless
choose the linear model for two reasons. First, theoretically it is much easier
to discuss the difference between within-country variation and between-country
variation. Empirically, due to the fact that we are forecasting, we are not inter-
ested in the coefficients ~β and do not mind that the fitted values, yˆit, are not
bounded between 0 and 1. Second, we are particularly interested in using fixed
effects and produce forecasts for countries that within-sample never experienced
an armed conflict or civil war.
It is easy to show that estimating the model in equation (2) encompasses
learning about pre-cursors to conflict in two ways: from the differences between
countries and from what happens across time within a country. Formally, we
can write the estimated coefficients ~β in terms of the two sums of squares which
capture the two sources of variation
~β =
[
~Stotalxx
]−1 (
~Swithinxy + ~S
between
xy
)
(3)
6Throughout we will indicate vectors through arrows. The only exception are means of
vectors
7For a summary see Beck (2015).
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where ~Stotalxx is the total sum of squares of the model ~xit.
8 It will be useful
to inspect the nominator of equation (3) separately. The first term in the
nominator, the within sum of squares, describes deviation of ~xit and yit from
the country means x¯i and y¯i through
~Swithinxy =
∑
i
∑
t
(~xit − x¯i) (yit − y¯i) , (4)
which captures the association of ~xit and conflict yit across time within a coun-
try, i.e. the within variation.
The second term in the nominator describes the deviation of the country
means, x¯i and y¯i, from the overall means x¯ and y¯ through
~Sbetweenxy =
∑
i
T (x¯i − x¯) (y¯i − y¯) (5)
which captures the association of the average values of x¯i and average conflict
y¯i between countries, i.e. the between variation. Variation in ~xit affects both
the within and between sum of squares in equations (4) and (5). A change in a
given year first immediately affects ~xit in (4). If ~xit changes permanently in a
country this implies a change in x¯i.
Equations (4) and (5) illustrate why the vector ~xit can become a predictor
of conflict. The first option is that ~xit deviates from its mean x¯i exactly when
conflict becomes imminent, i.e. when yit = 1. An economic crisis might, for
example, trigger conflict which would imply that a deviation of ~xit from x¯i
coincides with a change of yit from 0 to 1. The second option is that countries
whose average characteristics x¯i deviate from the overall average x¯ are more
(or less) likely to enter conflict than the average country. Political institutions,
which differ vastly between countries but change rarely, have often been found
to predict conflict in the cross-section.
Learning from ~Sbetweenxy exclusively means that the timing of instability can-
not be predicted. The between variation allows us to rank countries according
to their likelihood of destabilization but these rankings will not change from one
year to the next. This also means that countries which have been free of violence
in the past are likely to be “off the radar”. It is therefore questionable whether
a model that relies on large values of ~Sbetweenxy alone can be used effectively to
forecast conflict in the long run.
In many applications a policymaker might be interested in whether a par-
ticular country is more likely to enter a crisis than the year before. This is
especially important if sudden developments change established dynamics in a
country. Learning about the timing of instability is only possible from the within
variation, ~Swithinxy , in equation (4). From the equation we can see that countries
which remain in peace or only experience episodes with yit = 1 throughout the
sample cannot contribute to learning about timing as yit = y¯i in all years. This
might be a subtle point but it turns out to be of crucial importance in the actual
application because it prevents the use of the fixed effects logit framework to
predict conflict in previously peaceful countries.
8For a more detailed discussion see Greene (2003).
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3.2 Out-of-Sample Forecasting
The previous discussion made clear that regressions like in equation (2) mix the
between and within variation to estimate the parameters ~β. A straightforward
way to separate the within from the between variation is the fixed effects model
yit = βi + ~xit~β
FE + εit, (6)
where βi is a set of country fixed effects. The estimate of ~β
FE relies entirely on
the within variation in equation (4).9 This prevents us from making any con-
jectures regarding the transition to conflict from countries which are always in
conflict or always in peace. Instead, the learning process about what constitutes
a risk to stability is gathered exclusively from countries that have destabilized
or stabilized. In what follows, we adopt this linear model because it allows us
to produce forecasts for countries which have only yit = 1 or yit = 0. If we want
to estimate the probability of future conflict in a country that has been stable,
this is an essential property.
To illustrate our forecasting method, we forecast the timing of conflict out-
of-sample using three different conflict models, ~xit, suggested by the literature.
For each model we proceed in five steps:
1) We use all the data from all countries until year T as our estimation
sample. We estimate a fixed-effects regression as in equation (6) where the
vector ~xit is given by the respective empirical models described above and where
yit is a dummy that takes a value of one if conflict occurs one year later. The
exhibited results are always for the cases of the onset of conflict but hold for
incidence as well. We define as onset, the outbreak of a conflict following at
least one peaceful year, so a 1 preceded by at least one 0, whereas incidence is
any conflict year. When onset is our dependent variable, the following conflict
years are coded as missing.
2) We then use the respective estimates for βˆi, βˆ
FE to produce the fitted
values
yˆoverallit = βˆi + ~xitβˆ
FE
yˆwithinit = ~xitβˆ
FE
for the same set of countries but year t = T+1. The within fitted values, yˆwithinit ,
capture the risk of conflict compared to the country’s average propensity, i.e.
without taking into account whether the country was low or high risk in the
past. If we use the estimated yˆoverallit , we use both the within and between
variation contained in the model.
3) We predict the values of yit in T + 1. In particular, we forecast conflict
if the fitted value in T + 1 is higher than a cutoff c.10 Conversely, if the fitted
value is below the cutoff threshold c, we assume no conflict is going to take
9To see this note that ~βFE =
[
~Swithinxx
]−1 [
~Swithinxy
]
.
10In other words, we use a model estimated with data until T , applied to data available in
T + 1 to predict onset in year T + 2.
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place a year later. By comparing our estimates for yˆwithinit and yˆ
overall
it to a set
of varying cutoffs c, we generate the total number of true positives (TPc), the
number of true negatives (TNc), the number of false positives (FPc) and false
negatives (FNc).
4) We calculate the true positive rate (TPR)
TPRc =
TPc
FNc + TPc
and the false positive rate (FPR)
FPRc =
FPc
FPc + TNc
for each of the cutoffs c. The TPR is the share of all actual conflicts which is
correctly identified. A TPR of 0.4 implies that 40 percent of all conflicts are
correctly anticipated. The FPR captures the share of stable years, which are
falsely thought of as preceding conflict. A FPR of 0.4 implies that 40 percent
of all years without a conflict in the following year are falsely thought of as
preceding conflict.
5) This procedure is repeated for all years in the respective sample. We then
use the total TPRc and FPRc at different cutoffs to produce receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves. These depict the trade-off between TPRc and
FPRc and therefore capture the power in a simple and nonetheless meaningful
way. Note, that these summaries minimize the problems brought about by our
linear probability model. The transformation of fitted values to TPRc and
FPRc allows all possible values to be easily converted into the same trade-off.
In this way, the two dimensions of TPRc and FPRc provide a common space
in which to interpret the fitted values yˆwithinit and yˆ
overall
it , despite the fact that
yˆwithinit is centered around zero.
We separately test three different models xit using different samples, which
we discuss in detail in the Appendix. First, we use a model of rainfall shocks
on the African continent.11 Secondly, we use foreign aid shocks and income
shocks interacted with the country’s institutional environment to predict future
onset.12 Thirdly, we use a combination of endogenous economic and political
variables to forecast conflict.13 In all three models, we predict armed conflict and
civil war onset as measured by Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (and
PRIO) battle related deaths.14 This includes all battle related deaths which took
place in armed conflict. The UCDP defines an armed conflict as a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over which the use
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of
11We use the replication data provided by Miguel and Satyanath (2011).
12We use data and variable definitions from Besley and Persson (2011b).
13The model we use is based on Goldstone et al. (2010). This includes four political regime
dummies from polity IV, infant mortality, the share of the population that is discriminated
against and a dummy that captures whether more than three neighbouring countries had an
armed conflict.
14See Sambanis (2004) for a discussion of the conflict data.
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a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. It
also gives four types of conflict - we include battle-related deaths that occurred
during internal and internationalized internal armed conflict.15
The results for all three models are summarized in ROC curves in Figure 1.
These depict the true positive rate (TPR) on the y-axis and the false positive
rate (FPR) on the x-axis. Optimally, one would want a TPR of 1 at a FPR
of 0. This would mean that all conflicts are predicted without raising any false
alarms. The 45 degree line in ROC curves is the benchmark that would be
reached by random forecasts.
We first discuss the rainfall model which uses two precipitation growth rates
to forecast conflict. The two ROC curves in the left and right panel of Figure 1a
represent the overall model’s ability to forecast (blue solid line) and the within
model’s ability (red dashed line). When we predict onset with the overall model,
the results look promising. Both armed conflict and civil war onset are predicted
reasonably well with TPR far above the FPR, i.e. the 45 degree line. However,
the within variation contained in the model, captured by the red dashed line,
contributes relatively little to the ability to forecast. Summarizing the predictive
capacity in terms of the area under the curve (AUC), we see that for the left
panel the AUC drops from 0.85 to 0.58, and for the right panel from 0.74 to 0.64.
The second model combines proxies of external economic shocks together with
political institutions in the country. Again, the blue solid lines in the panels
of Figure 1b represent the forecasting capabilities of the overall model, yˆoverallit
while the red lines represent the forecasting power of yˆwithinit . The within model
now provides even less ability to forecast onset. We record a drop in the AUC
from 0.87 to 0.57 on the left, and from 0.77 to 0.48 on the right. The third model
presented in Figure 1c was developed to forecast instability. And, indeed, we
now see that the within variation provides some ability to forecast civil wars
out-of-sample. Nonetheless, the general impression is maintained. There is
a considerable difference in the forecast capabilities between the overall and
the within model, indicated by the fall in the AUC from 0.83 to 0.64 for civil
war, and from 0.76 to 0.48 for armed conflict. The difference is particularly
pronounced for armed conflict onset, which typically precedes civil war.16
By separating within and overall variation, we have established that most
of the forecasting power in the overall model comes from country fixed effects
with the AUC dropping by an average of 30 percent for both civil war and
armed conflict. In other words, conflict onset is predicted to a large extent by
the fact that it had previously taken place in a country. With some exceptions,
existing economic and political variables have a hard time predicting the timing
of conflict onset.
15All recent casualties in Afghanistan are, for example, coded as stemming from an interna-
tionalized internal conflict. We ran extensive robustness checks regarding our definition. For
a detailed discussion see the Appendix.
16We have checked that this result is not due to bad luck concerning the way in which we
combined variables. We have used a Lasso technique to select variables from a broad set of
economic and political variables and the variables selected in this way are strikingly close to
the model depicted in Figure 1c.
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Figure 1: ROC Curves for Onset
(a) Rainfall Model
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4 A Topic Model of Newspaper Text
In light of the difficulty of predicting the timing of conflict, our hope is that
news reports will generate time variation that goes beyond the economic and
political variables discussed in the previous section. However, to do this, we first
need to generate meaningful summaries of the news text written by journalists.
In this section, we first discuss the news reports we rely on, and then discuss
how we summarize them with the help of a topic model. Finally, we report on
the content of the estimated topics.
4.1 News Text
The first choice we face is the selection of our news sources. Due to their avail-
ability over a long time span and international coverage, we focus on three major
newspapers published in English, namely the Economist (available from 1975),
the New York Times (NYT) (available from 1980), and the Washington Post
(WP) (available from 1977). From the database LexisNexis we downloaded
all articles dating from January 1975 to December 2015 containing country
names (or slight permutations thereof) or capital names in the title.17 In to-
tal, we downloaded more than 700,000 articles, of which 174,450 are from the
Economist, 363,275 from the NYT, and 185,523 from the WP.
On average about 100 articles are written on a country in a given year.
However, the extent of coverage varies drastically with the type of country so
that we observe between 1 and more than 5500 articles in a given year. As a
general idea, more populous, richer and more democratic countries are covered
more. In addition, coverage increases in and before conflict. On average, a
conflict year is covered with about 100 articles more, while a pre-conflict year
is covered with almost 70 articles more than the average year.18 However, total
news articles in our dataset by newspaper are fairly constant across time as
shown in Figure 2, i.e. there is not a large increase in available news which
is typical for analysis that use all available sources of news.19 This is quite
intuitive. Total space for articles is fairly constant and so attention seems to
shift towards countries which seem newsworthy to journalists and editors. Our
methodology accounts for changes in coverage by using topic shares, i.e. we
disregard how much is written on a country and focus instead on what is written
on a country. This is important as it facilitates forecasting across countries.
In order to improve the performance of our machine learning algorithm, we
process the raw texts of articles of all three newspapers according to standard
17In the case of the Economist we also search in the leading paragraph as the title rarely
contains a country or capital name.
18The findings come from simple OLS regressions. The findings on conflict are robust to
the introduction of country fixed effects. Regression results are available from the authors on
request.
19The NYT generally seems to shift in an out of discussions of foreign affairs more than
the other two publications. Also, the period after the financial crisis saw a decline in news
from the NYT and the WP which could be explained by a stronger focus on internal affairs.
Around this time US troops were pulled out of Afghanistan and Iraq.
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Figure 2: Number of articles by news source over time
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text mining procedures. First, we remove a library of common words, which in
text mining are referred to as stop words, such as “to” or “that”.20 Second,
we lemmatize and then stem words using the Snowball algorithm, which is an
updated version of the algorithm from Porter (1980).21 Lemmatizing groups
variant forms of the same word into one word, while stemming attempts to
harmonize different usages of one word, such that, e.g. “running”, “ran”, and
“run” all become “run”. However, unlike the example, the outcome does not
necessarily represent an English word. Finally, since for our project we intend
to capture general rather than content specific to a single country, we remove
country names and names of people, identified by a library of names and the
usage of titles, such as “Mr” or “Mrs”.22 This leaves us with more than 5.5
million unique tokens, which are not only single words, but also tokens of se-
quences of two words and three words, referred to as bigrams and trigrams,
respectively. Then as a final step, we remove overly frequent and rare tokens.
Dropping rare tokens, in particular, means that we drop a lot of tokens from
the list without losing a lot of text. Even after this procedure we are left with
around 0.9 million tokens. This high dimensionality makes it impossible to
use the token vectors in standard regressions. Here is where the literature has
20See http://norm.al/2009/04/14/list-of-english-stop-words/ for the list of stop
words.
21The Python package for lemmatizing is available at http://www.nltk.org/_modules/
nltk/stem/wordnet.html and for stemming at http://snowball.tartarus.org.
22We use the Natural Language Toolkit dictionary of names for males
“names.words(’male.txt’)” and females “names.words(’female.txt’)”.
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typically reduced dimensionality by focusing on particular words.
4.2 LDA Topic Models
In order to reduce the high dimensionality of our data set, we use the latent
Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to model topics, a method introduced by Blei, Ng
and Jordan (2003). Topics are probability distributions over words. The LDA
model in text analysis assumes that each document is a mixture of a small
number of topics and that each word’s creation is attributable to one of the
document’s topics.
The exercise consists in splitting each article into topics k. One can imagine
an journalist writing about a topic will use a combination of words related to
that topic. For instance, an article about sports might be more likely to contain
words such as “football”, “win”, “fans”, and “game” and an article about a
conflict might be more likely to use words such as “violence”, “casualties”, and
“soldier”. Through Bayesian learning, the algorithm optimizes the weighted
word lists, i.e. the topics, in order to discriminate between articles. For instance,
the word “win” might be more of a sports-topic word and will, therefore, indicate
that an article is on sports. Ultimately, the mixed-membership model represents
each document as a set of shares of topics. One could imagine that an article
is classified as 70 percent sports and 30 percent conflict if a particularly violent
soccer match took place. However, topics themselves are also backed out. While
the number of topics K is pre-specified, the content of the topics is not. The
topics are identified by looking at which tokens co-occur in articles.
In more technical terms, LDA generates a stream of observable words wm,n,
partitioned into documents, which are vectors of words ~wm, i.e. the order of
words does not matter.23 The model assumes that for each of these documents,
a vector of topic proportions, ~ηm, is drawn from a Dirichlet distribution Dir(~α).
From this, topic-specific words are emitted. That is, for each word, a topic in-
dicator zm,n is sampled according to the document-specific mixture proportion,
and then the corresponding topic-specific term distribution, ~ϕzm,n , is used to
draw a word. The topics ~ϕk are sampled from a Dirichlet distribution Dir(~β)
once for the entire corpus. The key in estimating this model is that only the ~wm
are actually observed. Everything else needs to be backed out. Typically, the
elements of the vectors ~α and ~β are assumed to be the same for all documents
and topics, respectively. The LDA model can therefore be described by three
parameters α, β and the number of topics K.
For statistical inference we use a Gibbs sampling technique, which is a
Markov chain Monte Carlo method. At the very heart of the algorithm is the
likelihood that a word i in a document m is attributed to topic k in a step of
the chain. This is proportional to
p (zi = k | z−i, w) ∝
n
(t)
k,−i + β
V
t=1n
(t)
k,−i + β
· n
(k)
m,−i + α[
K
k=1n
(k)
m + α
]
− 1
(7)
23The following description is based on Heinrich (2009).
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where n
(t)
k,−i is the frequency by which the token of word i was attributed to the
same topic generally and n
(k)
m,−i is the frequency by which all other words in the
same document m are attributed to the topic. This highlights the role played by
co-occurrence. The algorithm forms topics around tokens that appear together
in many documents. The term
(
n
(k)
m,−i + α
)([
K
k=1n
(k)
m + α
]
− 1
)−1
ensures that
if a lot of tokens in a text are attributed to the same topic then it is more likely
that that token i in the same text will also be attributed to the same topic.
High values of α imply that each article is likely to consist of a mix of many
topics. Analogously, a high value of β favours a topic to contain a mixture of
most words, whereas low values allow topics to consist of a limited number of
prominent words.
We let the chain run for 1000 iterations.24 Our preferred specifications,
which we will be using for all of the baseline results presented in Section 5, is
composed of 15 topics and hyperparameters α = 3.1 and β = 0.01. Concerning
α and β we follow the literature; but we estimated models for 5, 10 and 30
topics. All of these yield very similar results.
4.3 Topic Estimation Results
In order to be able to use the estimated topics in out-of-sample forecasting we
need to estimate the model for each year. We start forecasting in 1995 so that
the first topic model we estimate uses all articles between 1975 and 1995. We
estimate one model for each consecutive year, where the last model uses all text
from 1975 up to 2015.
The K distributions over terms, ~ϕ1, ..., ~ϕK , are called topics. In our appli-
cation to the news content the estimated topics seem natural and intuitive, i.e.
when we look at the most common words in each topic it is fairly easy to come
up with a title for the topic. For example, in all years topics appear which we
can classify as conflict, sports, tourism, the economy and politics.
In Figure 3, we present four topics from the 2015 estimation as word clouds
of the top 50 words of the topic. In these clouds, the size of each word is pro-
portional to its likelihood within the corresponding topic. Notice that words are
stemmed/lemmatized versions so that ”armi”, for example, stands for ”army”
and ”armies”. The two clouds in Figures 3a and 3b quite clearly suggest (poten-
tial) violence. Words like force and military indicate as much. It is important
to keep in mind that the tokens shown in these word clouds are only the tip of
the iceberg. Topics are a probability distribution over hundreds of thousands
of tokens. This is important as the full list of tokens associated with the topics
in Figure 3, for example, could include factors that trigger or at least antici-
pate conflict. Figure 3c seems to summarize processes in the justice system.
24The C++ Gibbs Sampler we use is provided by Phan and Nguyen (2007) and is available
at http://gibbslda.sourceforge.net. We use the default values for burn-in and thinning.
For a detailed and user-friendly description of the usage of LDA for topic modelling, we refer
to Heinrich (2009).
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Figure 3: Word Clouds of Topics
(a) Conflict 1 (b) Conflict 2
(c) Justice (d) Economics
Notes: These are the top 50 words of four out of 15 topics computed using LDA with
α = 3.1 and β = 0.01. The size of a word represents its probability within a given topic.
The topic in Figure 3d describes economics. In our discussion of which topics
predict conflict, we will treat this topic as the omitted category.
After estimating the topic model, we are in possession of a dataset containing
the composition of each article m in terms of the K topics, ~ηm. The question
remains of how to aggregate the shares in each article to receive a topic distri-
bution in a country-year. We use a simple method that takes into account the
prior probability distribution of topics in the Dirichlet distribution. Call Mit
the group of articles written in country i and year t. The k × 1 vector of topic
shares in country i in year t is then
~θit = (m∈Mit~ηmNm + α)/ (m∈MitNm +Kα) (8)
where m∈MitNm is simply the total number of articles. Note that α enters here
as the strength of the prior. If only few words are written in a country-year
then the deviation from this prior will be relatively weak. If a lot of words are
written, the posterior topic distribution can deviate strongly from the prior.
In order to use our estimates when forecasting out-of-sample, we need to
estimate a full panel of topic shares ~θit for each year T . Figure 4 plots the
average share of the economics and one of the conflict topics between 1980 and
2015 as seen through the lens of topics estimated in 2015. The average share
is fairly stable across time. Even when the global financial crisis breaks out
in 2009, the economics topic gains only about 2 percentage points of all words
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written in the three newspapers on average. This does not mean, however, that
topic shares do not change dramatically at the country level. We return to the
content of topics in Section 7 after presenting the main results.
Figure 4: Average Topic Shares of Economics and Conflict and Over Time
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Notes: Average topic shares are computed using aggregated country/year topic shares.
5 Predicting Conflict with Newspaper Topics
In this section, we use the estimated topic shares in linear fixed effects regres-
sion to forecast conflict out-of-sample. Our estimation method follows the one
described in Section 3.2 with only slight changes. In each year T between 1995
and 2013, we estimate a topic model using text written between year 1975 and
year T . We obtain a vector of 15 topic shares ~θit in country i at time t, which
we calculate as in equation (8). Then we use these shares as our explanatory
variables ~xit in our estimation equation (6).
As before, we calculate two sets of fitted values
yˆoverallit = βˆi +
~θitβˆ
topics
and
yˆwithinit =
~θitβˆ
topics
for the same set of countries and year t = T + 1. Using a set of varying cutoffs
c and our estimates for yˆwithinit and yˆ
overall
it , we calculate the true positive rate
TPRc and the false positive rate FPRc for each of the cutoffs c. The results
can be presented in standard ROC curves.
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5.1 Main Results
In principle, both the prediction of onset and incidence should be of interest.
Predicting onset is a lot more demanding as we have to estimate the parameters
of the model from a reduced sample of years. Incidence is of interest as it
produces an overall measure of start, continuation and end of conflict. However,
since most conflicts contain a large number of consecutive conflict years, findings
here are driven to a large degree by conflict continuation and not onset and end.
Our main results is shown in the two graphs in Figure 5, which show receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the outbreak of both civil war and
armed conflict.25 The blue lines in all four panels show the forecasting perfor-
mance using the fitted values from the overall news model yˆoverallit while the red
lines provide the ROC curve of the within model yˆwithinit . As before, one would
want a true positive rate of 1 at a false positive rate of 0. This would mean that
all conflicts are predicted without raising any false alarms. The 45 degree line
in ROC curves is the benchmark that would be reached by random forecasts.
Figure 5: ROC Curves for Onset (Topic Model)
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Notes: The topic model is based 15 topics computed using LDA with α = 3.1 and β = 0.01,
which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is the complete model net
of country fixed effects.
Figure 5 shows that news topics fair well at predicting onset of both civil war
and armed conflict. When predicting civil war onset, the news model generates
25The results hold not only for the onset of conflict but also incidence as well as can be seen
in the Appendix in Figure C.1.
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a TPR of about 70 percent for a FPR of 20 percent. Furthermore, the predictive
power of the within model is very close to the predictive power of the full model.
This is quite a striking finding given the difficulty of forecasting the timing of
such rare events. The model of predicting the onset of armed conflict performs
worse but the same basic pattern as with civil war onset is maintained.26 Again,
the within variation seems to be the main driver of the ability to forecast conflict.
The AUC only drops from 0.83 (0.80) in the complete model to 0.78 (0.72) in
the within model. This is an important difference to variables which capture
the economic or political fundamentals presented in Section 3.2, which suffer an
average drop of 0.3.
Our topic model performs extremely well when predicting conflict incidence.
The overall model can predict 90 percent of both civil wars and armed conflicts
correctly at a false positive rate (FPR) of only 20 percent. At a false positive rate
of 50 percent the true positive rate is close to 1. A large share of this forecasting
power comes from the within variation. When predicting civil wars the within
variation reaches a TPR rate of 80 percent for a FPR of 20 percent. For armed
conflict the within variation of the news model performs worse but still generates
a TPR of 60 percent for a FPR of 20 percent. The better performance of these
models is driven to a large degree by the fact that conflict follows conflict.
Nonetheless, we believe that the fact that topics can pick this up is useful.
Topics provide an automated summary of text. This is a particular ad-
vantage for forecasting if parts of the text become useful which one would not
have payed attention to otherwise. To check this we contrast our model with
a model based on a set of word counts as suggested by Chadefaux (2014).27
These counts are useful for forecasting under the prior that conflict words will
anticipate conflict. Figure 6 shows ROC curves for the word-count model in
blue and the ROC curves for our topic model as dashed red lines. When pre-
dicting the timing of civil war onset, word counts provide quite a lot of forecast
capacity. At a false positive rate of 20 percent they reach a true positive rate of
over 50 percent. However, the topic model still adds about 20 percentage points
to the true positive rate - based on exactly the same text. When predicting
armed conflict onset the difference between the two ways of summarizing the
text becomes even more striking. Words counts now do not predict onset. This
is interesting because it indicates that what provides our topic model with its
forecasting power when predicting onset is not the rise in tokens directly related
to conflict. We return to this insight in section 7. The topic model also performs
better when predicting incidence but the gap between topics and word counts
is much smaller.
We have run several robustness checks regarding these basic results which
we report in Appendix B. First, we also used more and less topics.28 As shown
26The onset of armed conflict is particularly difficult to predict as it is preceded by years
without organized violence.
27We follow his methodology closely and count the words in our news data for every coun-
try/year. We then generate a model based on the four word-count variables also used by
Chadefaux (2014).
28We adjust α accordingly to maintain the ratio α = 50/K. We have resisted the temptation
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Figure 6: ROC Curves for Onset (Topic Model vs Word Counts)
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Notes: Word counts are computed by counting the frequency of the list of conflict words
defined by Chadefaux (2014) per country/year. The topic model is based 15 topics computed
using LDA with α = 3.1 and β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The
within model is the complete model net of country fixed effects.
in the Appendix in Figure B.1, results remain largely unchanged with five topics
but forecasting power drops slightly when predicting armed conflict onset. With
10 or 30 topics, the results are very similar to 15 topics. It seems reasonable to
assume that if we would increase topics further, the model would fit very will
within-sample but worse out-of-sample. We made this experience when trying
to fit more standard variables. The model tends to overfit to specific situations,
which then do not generalize out-of-sample.
Secondly, we show that, building on a standard model, the topic shares
add forecasting power. This indicates that it is not simply reporting on basic
economic and political facts that helps us forecast.
Thirdly, we add an indicator for contemporaneous conflict to the incidence
model to see whether the news model provides forecasting power beyond the
simple logic that conflict follows conflict. News reports add forecasting power
beyond an already very high benchmark. This confirms the idea that the topic
model has some value.
Fourthly, we discuss using different definitions of conflict in the appendix.
Again, we find similar results. We have also analysed how well our model
of testing different topic models close to 15 topics as this would put the idea behind running
out-of-sample tests on its head.
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performs when forecasting conflict two years before onset. The within model
performs only slightly worse. Interestingly, the overall model performs very
similarly which confirms the idea that the between variation dominates the
overall model. If the forecast is time invariant, it does not matter whether
conflict breaks out one or two years later.
Fifth, we contrast our forecasting model with the event data generated by
the Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS). The comparison is
particularly interesting as event data provides an alternative summary of news
reports. We find that topics are, generally, able to forecast better when fore-
casting onset and that there is no clear dominance when forecasting incidence.
Finally, we use our topic model to predict refugee movements. To do so, we
use data on refugees from the UNHCR and try to predict the onset of a large
number of refugees. We use two different cutoffs, 30,000 persons and 130,000,
which is similarly common to armed conflict and civil war. Again we find that
the within variation has a lot of predictive power, in this case as much or more
than the overall model. This exercise underlines the usefulness of news text in
providing early warning for events which are not themselves reported by the
news.
The main takeaway from all these tests is that the timing of conflict can be
predicted using automated summaries of news reports. The topic models pro-
duce a relatively high true positive rate for relatively low rates of false positives.
However, for rare events such as civil war and armed conflict, false positives are
a problem even at low rates, as the majority of country/years are non-conflict
years. A way to capture this problem is precision,
Pc =
TPc
FPc + TPc
,
which gives the number of years in which conflict was predicted correctly divided
by all conflict predictions. Hence, the difference between Pc and the TPRc is
that true positives are not set into a relation to all years of conflict (FNc+TPc)
but to all years in which conflict was predicted (FPc + TPc). In Figure 7 we
compare precision to the TPRc for our main model with 15 topics. Note that
the new curves can take values of Pc of 0 and 1 for TPRc = 0, depending on
whether the first positives are true or false positives. As the TPRc goes towards
1, precision will converge towards the ratio between conflict and non-conflict
observations.
In the Appendix in Figure C.2 we can see that precision starts out very
high when predicting incidence. At a true positive rate of 80 percent, precision
is still above 20 percent when predicting civil wars and above 50 percent when
predicting armed conflict. This means that the large majority of armed conflicts
are correctly anticipated at the cost of raising false alarms in only half the cases.
The within variation contained in the model is, again, an important part of the
overall variation. Precision is generally much lower when predicting onset. This
reflects the fact that onset is harder to predict and is much rarer. Still, the
perception that the time variation is useful in the news model is maintained.
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Figure 7: Precision Recall Curves for Onset
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Notes: The curves are based on the results of the topic model computed using LDA with
α = 3.1 and β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is
the complete model net of country fixed effects.
6 How the Within View Changes Early Warning
In this section we imagine the results from the previous section would be used by
an agent who is interested in forecasting conflict events correctly. This could be,
for example, inhabitants and firms inside the country itself, foreign investors, a
ministry for foreign policy in a different country or a risk insurer. Implicitly all
of these actors would be interested in setting up a cutoff, c, which would trigger
some sort of response or closer scrutiny. It turns out that this way of thinking
about this problem of forecasting delivers a simple way to think about how risk
perceptions change with the adoption of the within and between model.
As pointed out by Kennedy (2015), the relevant information for a decision
problem of how to set up a cutoff, c, in such a scenario combines the results in
the previous section with the agent’s attribution of weights to the four outcomes
TPc, FPc, TNc and FNc. Let us denote the costs for these as kTP , kFP , kTN ,
and kFN , respectively. The policymaker will then minimize total costs
min
c
costs (c) = TPc × kTP + FPc × kFP + TNc × kTN + FNc × kFN . (9)
Potentially this problem could be fed with country-specific cost parameters.
One could, for example, give allies, trade partners, or countries with larger
populations more weight. For now, we only aim to illustrate the change in
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perspective that the within variation would give on this choice problem.
First, the policymaker would need to choose a cutoff implied by her model.
This will be a function of the cost parameters assumed. To simplify the discus-
sion, assume that the costs of correct predictions are kTP = kTN = 0. Typically
one would attribute a high cost to kFN because a negative surprise might be
particularly costly for the policymaker, kFN > kFP . We then look at two sce-
narios regarding the remaining parameters. First, assume that false positives
are relatively cheap, for example that they cost only five percent of a false neg-
ative, kFP = 0.05 ∗ kFN . Second, assume that the costs of false positives are
relatively high, ten percent of the costs of false negatives kFP = 0.1 ∗ kFN .
We use these parameter values to evaluate the total costs generated by dif-
ferent cutoffs, c. For every country/year we first generate a dummy that takes
a value of 1 if the condition yˆoverallit ≥ c is satisfied. We then compare that
dummy to the variable yit to generate the set of variables TPc, FPc, TNc and
FNc. Finally, we calculate costs (c) from equation (9).
Figure 8: Cost Curves for Armed Conflict Incidence
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Notes: Cost curves are computed using kFP = 0.05kFN (low) and kFP = 0.1kFN (high).
In panel a) of Figure 8, we show the results under the assumption that false
positives carry a low costs. The cost function takes a U-shape with a minimum
at around c = 0.05. At this value the model generates a large TPR of around
75 percent and a FPR of 29 percent.29 For lower values of c the number of false
29It is easy to verify that this point is indeed on the blue line in Figure 5, panel b). The
line in the TPR and FPR space flattens considerably at this point which means our model
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positives would increase too much compared to the gain in true positives. For
higher values of c we would get more false negatives and higher costs.
The picture changes significantly in panel b) of Figure 8 where we assume
a higher relative cost of false positives. Now the minimum cost is reached just
below c = 0.15. The higher cutoff reflects the fact that false positives have
become more costly. At this cutoff the model generates a TPR of 35 percent
and a FPR or 8 percent which, again, is a point on the blue line in Figure 5,
panel b). Clearly, we have now less false positives per false negatives.
An important advantage of assuming a cost structure is that we can simplify
the four dimensions of forecasting models into one single dimension. This al-
lows us to compare our within and between model with a simple cost measure.
In Figure 9 we compare the total minimal cost by country generated in the
within and between model if we assume a low cost of false positives.30 Under
these assumptions the between model produces more false negatives and the
within model produces more false positives. In other words, the within model
anticipated more conflicts but generates more false positives while it is trying to
predict the timing of conflict. Strikingly, the within model would have predicted
the most recent onsets in Egypt and Libya while the between model would not
have.
Figure 9: Cost Comparison of Within and Overall Model
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produces a lot of additional false positives for few true positives at this point.
30In the between model we use c = 0.033 and in the within model we use c = 0.04 as this
minimizes costs.
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In addition, there is are large differences with regard to which countries pro-
duce high costs in the two models. Azerbaijan, for example, generates very high
costs in the within model as several onsets of armed conflict took place in a row,
two of which remained undetected by the model. The between model generates
larger costs in, for example, Eritrea, Uzbekistan, Libya and Nigeria. This is
evidence that, at the very least, the within model can add a new perspective on
the problem of forecasting even when compared to the overall model. However,
such a model should only be used if it generates meaningful variation, as does
our proposed topic model.
7 How News Topics Forecast Timing
We have shown that topics generated from news reports can be used to forecast
the timing of conflict, i.e. the within variation. We have also shown that this
can lend a new perspective on how country risk is perceived. We now turn
towards analyzing the exact news content which is responsible for our ability to
forecast.
The topic summaries of our articles can provide useful clues as to what
predicts conflict. As already mentioned in Section 4.3 several topics appear
consistently and with similar word lists across years. We can therefore test
each topics’ relation to conflict in several samples.31 In order to test which
topics predict conflict, we first categorize word lists in each of the years in
our test samples with T running from 1995 to 2013. For each sample lasting
until year T , we then use these codings in fixed effects panel regressions and
record the estimated coefficients on the variables ~θk and their standard errors.
As before, the dependent variable is a dummy which indicates one year before
conflict onset. The topic of economics, for example, appears consistently across
all years. In order to have a consistent benchmark from one year to the next,
we make this topic our omitted category. This means all estimated coefficients
should be interpreted relative to this topic.
Results for four of our topics are summarized in Figure 10. Each dot repre-
sents the coefficient of the respective topic share from a single fixed effect panel
regression. The coefficients are ordered by magnitude with the x-axis exhibiting
the relative rank of the coefficient. The blue dots represent coefficients which
are significantly different from 0, i.e. different from the effect of the economics
topic benchmark at the 10 percent level, whereas red dots represent insignificant
ones. The thin vertical black lines illustrate the 90 percent confidence interval.32
Topics which contain conflict words increase relative to the economics topic
before conflict breaks out. In addition, words that describe judicial procedures
seem to decrease before conflict while words describing the Middle East increase.
For the remaining topics not shown here we find that they seem to behave
similar to economics, i.e. the estimated coefficients we get are centered around
31Note that here we are looking at relations of topics to one year before conflict in-sample,
rather than out-of-sample as in Section 4.3.
32Some Figures show less coefficients because not all topics appear in all years.
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zero and mostly insignificant. The coefficient of the topic describing industry or
tourism, for example, are sometimes positive, sometimes negative, but generally
not significantly different from economics. Note, however, this can still mean
that news on industry, economics and tourism all decrease relative to the conflict
topic one year before conflict.
Figure 10: Coefficients of Topic Shares for Onset
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Notes: The coefficients and confidence intervals for each of the four to of 15 topics are obtained
from a fixed effect panel regression with a dummy for one year before the onset of conflict as
dependent variable. We use both armed conflict and civil war as dependent variable for all
available samples from 1995 to 2015. The coefficients are ordered by magnitude.
Next, we can look into the cases in which conflict was predicted by our
model through high fitted values and look inside the distribution of topic shares
for all articles written during these years. In other words, we now look at the
article shares ~ηm and compare years before conflict onset to other peaceful years.
As a measure of our prediction we take the cutoff of c = 0.05 derived in the
previous section. With this cutoff, we predicted 35 conflict onsets in 25 countries
correctly.33 In what follows we focus on these cases and compare high risk to
low risk years within the same countries.
We want to know how writing changes before conflict. To understand this
we first look at the full distribution of topic shares in the articles. Figure
33The countries are Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Cote
d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
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11 shows the kernel densities for all articles written during peacetime in our
conflict countries. On the y-axis we display the kernel density and on the x-
axis we display the respective topic share. In the top panels we compare the
distribution of the shares for ~ηm,conflict and ~ηm,economics in the years with high
and low risk.34 A value of ~ηm,economics = 0.2 in panel a) means, for example,
that one-fifth of the tokens in these articles were written on economics. If more
is written on economics during conflict, we would observe that more articles
contain a higher share of economics during conflict, which would change the red
dashed line.
From panel a) in Figure 11 it is clear that there are no obvious observable
changes in the shares written on economics. The distributions of ~ηm,economics
displayed in panel a) is very similar in high and low risk years. The peak in
each of the kernel densities is close to the prior of 1/15, and the mass of articles
in the tails is almost identical in the two distributions. We only observe a slight
concentration of articles with low economics shares close to the prior. There
are, however, more visible changes in the distribution of ~ηm,conflict. Now the
density around the prior drops visibly one year before conflict onset. At the
same time, many more articles contain higher conflict shares.
In the bottom of Figure 11, we look at two additional topic dimensions -
justice and the second conflict dimension. Again, there are significant changes.
News that contain tokens related to justice decrease more visibly, albeit not
drastically. The density around the prior increases slightly and less articles
with high justice shares are written. In addition, we can detect a visible shift on
the second conflict dimension. The density of articles with low conflict shares
decreases and we get visibly more articles with shares above 0.10.
What this illustrates is that the shifts in topic shares ~θit are not driven by
shifts in which all journalists suddenly report much more on conflict or less on
economics. Instead, some articles seem to change character while most maintain
their topic mix.35 This reveals how the journalistic work conducted in these
countries adds information. It is about a completely new kind of news story
making headlines and not about changing nuances within already pre-existing
news stories.
As an additional illustration of how the justice topic helps predicts conflict,
we show how it evolves before and after conflict by regressing the justice topic
share on dummies for the number of years before the onset of conflict and
the number of years after conflict has ended.36 As can be seen in Figure 12,
the justice topic decreases significantly one year prior to conflict and increases
after conflict has ended. Strikingly, there seems to be a significant boom of
news stories after conflict. The fact that stories on trials and justice disappear
before conflict could indicate that judicial institutions are less active before
34To be as consistent as possible, we always use the share estimates as estimated from the
topic estimation in the last year, 2013.
35The change of only some articles to high conflict shares is consistent with the findings in
Nimark and Pitschner (2016), who show that small news stories are picked up by only some
news sources while larger events unify reporting across sources.
36In this regression we control for country fixed effects and the remaining topic shares.
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Figure 11: Topic Shares of Economics, Justice, and Conflict in the Universe of
Articles when Risk Is High vs Low
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violence breaks out. A second margin through which justice relates to the
outbreak of conflict is that once conflict has ended, articles about war trials
and police prosecution begin to surface, which seem to indicate the sustainable
end of a conflict and the (re)establishment of a functioning state. The fact
that economics, for example, does not react as strongly could indicate that
judicial institutions and processes have a particularly strong effect on post-
conflict stability. In any case, the pattern we see in the data is consistent both
with the idea that post conflict justice is a crucial factor for stability or that
legal checks and balances play an important role in keeping existing tensions
from becoming violent.
An important takeaway from Figures 10, 11, and 12 is that our forecasting
model can rely on more than one dimension of the news content when forecast-
ing. Writing on justice, for example, decreases clearly before conflict. In this
context, it is important to stress that the coefficients we display in Figure 10
are coming from regressions which control for the conflict topic shares. In other
words, justice adds predictive power beyond conflict and relative to economics.
We show in Figure C.3 in the Appendix that for cases in which we predict
conflict, we also find visible changes in the distribution of articles on industry
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Figure 12: The Justice Topic Before and After the Outbreak of Conflict
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Notes: The coefficients and confidence intervals are obtained by regressing the justice topic
share on the remaining topic shares, and dummies for the number of years before the onset
of conflict and the number of years after conflict has ended. In this panel regression with
country fixed effects, conflict years have been set to missing.
and tourism.37 Our model is, therefore, able to spot a relatively diverse set of
risks to internal peace. In addition, increases in the non-conflict dimensions can
indicate a stabilization. This is important because forecasting correctly requires
that the model exhibits falling risk at times in which countries stabilize.38
8 Conclusions
In this article we present a new method of aggregating news text in a meaningful
way. Topic models have the ability to diminish the dimensionality of text from
counts of more than one million expressions to, for example, 15 topics. We have
argued that, aggregated this way, news text can be used to predict the timing
of conflict.
Our findings highlight that models need to be tested for whether their within
variation is meaningful. If not, policymakers might rely on meaningless changes
37See Figure C.3 in the Appendix.
38For example, the risk of a civil war onset fell by over 9 percentage points in Angola when
the most intense violence ended in 2001. And this was despite the fact that armed conflict
flared up several times during this time. An important correlate of this fall in risk was an
expansion in news stories about industry together with a decrease in the conflict topic.
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of risk across time and this has the potential to lead to large errors. We have
shown, for example, that the within variation of a standard model has surpris-
ingly little power when forecasting the timing of armed conflict. This is a finding
that should be taken into account when interpreting existing studies that do not
distinguish within from between variation.
Ultimately, forecasters might face a trade-off between prediction with max-
imum accuracy overall or using a less accurate model that generates useful
variation across time. At the very least, using a model with useful variation
across time should provide a useful addition for forecasters. Having useful vari-
ation in conflict risk across time might be of value on its own right. There are
many cases for which our model reports sudden increases in conflict risk which
were not followed by conflict. There are two options regarding this variation.
First, it might be due to reporting in the newspapers we use. For example,
the invasion of Iraq generated a lot of “conflict” news which might have spilled
over to other countries. Second, risk might have actually increased but policies
prevented destabilization. Our within measure of conflict risk for Egypt, for
example, shows several increases and decreases before the most recent outbreak
of violence.
Topic models could provide a useful alley for research in political events more
generally.39 We have used the most simple, off-the-shelf, version of the various
algorithms available and have used the same text collection for estimating the
topic model and calculating topic shares. One could instead train a topic model
on specific subsets of texts or on a separate set of texts and then use this to
spot the generated topics in the main body of newspaper articles. Applications
include training a topic model on academic articles or specialized country reports
and then using the generated topics to figure out which set of topics lead to
better forecasts. Technical extensions or refinements could include using more
recently developed topic modelling techniques, such as dynamic topic models
(Blei and Lafferty 2006) or a structural topic model (Roberts et al. 2013).
39In addition, our method could be used for nowcasting as there is a striking degree of
accuracy in which conflict periods and even intensity is captured by our model.
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Appendix
A Standard Models
We use three models to forecast conflict. The first uses two variables provided
in the replication dataset for Miguel and Satyanath (2011), contemporaneous
rainfall growth and lagged rainfall growth for about 40 African countries. The
second model uses six variables from the replication dataset from Besley and
Persson (2011b). The third model we use is from Goldstone et al. (2010). We
follow their generation of the political institutions dummy closely. We also add
data on infant mortality from the world bank and the share of population which
is discriminated from the GROWup dataset. The latter is a slight deviation
from the original model in Goldstone et al. (2010). However, the discrimination
variable is extremely robust within-sample so that we doubt this lowers the
ability of this model to forecast. Finally, we add a count of adjacent countries
with an ongoing armed conflict.
We merge this data with data on battle-related deaths from UCDP/PRIO.
In the construction of our internal war variable we tried to err on the inclusive
side, i.e. within reasonable boundaries of doubt we want to code a year as
a conflict year if some violence took place. We want to be inclusive because
we want to consider as much ongoing violence as possible. We therefore count
battle-related deaths in internal and internationalised internal conflicts. The
latter includes, for example, casualties caused by international terrorism and
violence in Afghanistan. We use the best estimates for battle-related deaths
and define armed conflict as a year with at least 25 battle-related deaths and a
year of civil war as a year with at least 1000 battle-related deaths. In addition
we code a year as being in conflict if the mean between the low and the high
estimate crossed these thresholds. We have run robustness checks in which we
both expand and restrict this definition - results always stay similar.
In order to ensure comparability across models we only include countries
with more than 1 million inhabitants. Summary statistics for all variables in
our sample are in Table 1.
We also tried looked at the within-sample performance for all three models.
The results were fairly inconsistent in the model following Besley and Persson
(2011b), broadly consistent in the model following Goldstone et al. (2010) and
very consistent in the case of Miguel and Satyanath (2011). However, these
differences can, perhaps, largely be explained by the different methodology we
use. Besley and Persson (2011b) try to explain incidence with contemporaneous
data, Goldstone et al. (2010) use a non-linear model, produce random samples
from their sample to reduce the number of zeros and add sub-continent fixed
effects instead of country fixed effects. Only Miguel and Satyanath (2011) use
a very similar framework. In light to the out-of-sample performance of these
three models, it is worth noting the contrast between the rainfall model and the
model inspired by Goldstone et al. (2010). In the latter case, we only find one
coefficient which is significantly different from zero. Yet, this model performs
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extremely well when predicting the timing of civil war onset out-of-sample. The
rainfall model looks like the more robust model but has only little power when
forecasting onset out-of-sample.
B Robustness of Main Findings
In this section we discuss the robustness of our main findings. The, perhaps,
most important question is whether the parameters of the topic model we have
chosen has repercussions for its performance in forecasting. Note that for each
topic model we estimate we need to estimate the model every year so that the
estimation of a topic model with 15 topics takes about ten days. For more
topics the time increases considerably. While we have mostly stuck to standard
assumptions, our experiments with different values for α and β did not reveal
any systematic effect on predictions. The number of topics, however, does affect
performance.
When we move to less topics the performance only suffers slightly. Appendix
Figure B.1 shows the performance of a topic model with 5 topics. We have
also run robustness checks with 10 topics and 30 topics which both yielded
very similar results to 15 topics. Appendix Figure B.2 shows our main results
regarding onset for our model with 30 topics.
Figure B.1: ROC Curves for Onset (Five Topics)
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Notes: The topic model is based five topics computed using LDA with α = 10 and β = 0.01,
which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is the complete model net
of country fixed effects.
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Figure B.2: ROC Curves for Onset (Thirty Topics)
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Notes: The topic model is based on thirty topics computed using LDA with α = 1 and
β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is the complete
model net of country fixed effects.
An important question is whether our news model can add to an existing
standard model. This is the approach typically taken by the political science
literature, which augments existing models with news data. As it is the natural
benchmark for our analysis, we use a model which includes four political regime
dummies from polity IV, infant mortality, the share of the population that is
discriminated against, and a dummy that captures whether more than three
neighbouring countries had an armed conflict. To this we add the 15 topics. In
Figures B.3 and B.4 we show that, building on a standard model, the topic shares
add forecasting power. For civil war the AUC of the within model increases from
0.68 to 0.78 and for armed conflict from 0.45 to 0.59 due to the inclusion of our
topics. In the case of armed conflict onset, the model is now relatively weak,
i.e. the joint model performs worse than the news shares alone. This probably
reflects the problem of overfitting, which we mentioned previously.
A similar question is whether our news model of incidence can add anything
beyond the simple forecasting model of “conflict follows conflict”. To test this
we add our news shares to a model in which the dummy yit is regressed on a
dummy which captures contemporaneous conflict, yit−1. The result is shown in
Figure B.5. From this it becomes clear that the lag is a powerful forecast for
incidence and that our news model nonetheless adds some forecasting power.
We have also experimented with variables that count the years since the last
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Figure B.3: ROC Curves for Incidence (Standard Model Plus Topics)
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Notes: The standard model includes four political regime dummies from polity IV, infant
mortality, the share of the population that is discriminated against, and a dummy that cap-
tures whether more than three neighbouring countries had an armed conflict to which we add
topics based on 15 topics computed using LDA with α = 3.1 and β = 0.01. The within model
is the complete model net of country fixed effects.
conflict in the prediction of onset, and found that onset is not easy to predict
even by polynomials of this variable, which means our model provides a lot more
additional power in this case.
We also used our model to forecast conflict onset one or two years before it
happens. The results, displayed in Figure B.6 are qualitatively similar to our
main results. However, an interesting change is that while the overall model
performs almost as before, the within model performs worse. This underlines
the difference in the logic between these two models. Predicting the onset of
conflict is harder two years before it occurs if one wants to predict the timing
of it. But the between risk is very similarly so that the overall model performs
almost equally well.
We have also experimented with the type of conflict we predict. To do this
we have changed our conflict definition to include all types of conflict (including
external wars) and results remain as can be seen in Figure B.7. We have also
used only battle-related deaths occurring in internal wards and have used only
the best estimate of those. Our within results are getting slightly stronger under
this much more restrictive definition of internal conflict. We also follow Mueller
(2016) and define conflict as an armed conflict that exceeded an intensity of 0.08
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Figure B.4: ROC Curves for Incidence (Standard Model Plus Topics)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
False Positive Rate
a) Civil War (within)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
False Positive Rate
b) Armed Conflict (within)
Standard model Standard model plus topics
Notes: The standard model includes four political regime dummies from polity IV, infant
mortality, the share of the population that is discriminated against, and a dummy that cap-
tures whether more than three neighbouring countries had an armed conflict to which we add
topics based on 15 topics computed using LDA with α = 3.1 and β = 0.01. The within model
is the complete model net of country fixed effects.
battle-related deaths per 1000 inhabitants. The idea here is that the importance
of the event at the country level should follow a per-capita logic. A conflict with
25 casualties in India, for example, might not be as newsworthy for national news
agencies as if the same event would take place in Venezuela. Again our topic
model exhibits high predictive power within and overall as can be seen in B.8.
In addition, we have experimented with a different dataset on political violence
used by Besley and Persson (2011b). Here, violence includes purges from the
dataset of Banks (2005) and data on armed conflict from the Armed Conflict
Database. Our model is able to forecast both incidence and onset of political
violence in this data (Figure B.9). In particular, the within and overall model
perform very similarly. However, the forecasting power when forecasting onset
is reduced considerably. This likely reflects the fact that only relatively few
onsets occur in the shorter period of time (1996-2005).
In the main text we compare our model to the Integrated Conflict Early
Warning System (ICEWS) as described in Ward et al. (2013), which uses event
data generated from news. We see our work as complementary to this work and
Chadefaux (2014) for several reasons. First, our method allows us to use all news
content to predict civil war without imposing any priors. The use of negative
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Figure B.5: ROC Curves for Incidence (Lagged and Topics)
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Notes: The conflict lag model includes a lag of conflict to which we add the topic model based
on 15 topics computed using LDA with α = 3.1 and β = 0.01.
correlations to elements in the news, for example justice, is a direct result of
this. However, this means we need to rely on sources that provide the entire
text of articles. Second, the fact that we try to forecast the onset of rare events
one and even two years before they happen implies that we need to rely on news
sources that are consistently available for decades. We, therefore, relied on three
newspapers which gives a little more than 700,000 articles. For comparison,
the ICEWS uses more than 30 million news stories, whereas Chadefaux (2014)
searches keywords in over 60 million pages of news text.
As we did not have a strong prior regarding which model from Ward et al.
(2013) to use, we tried several ones. In the end, the best performance was
reached by a model which includes all the events described in the paper but
no other variables. In Figure B.10 we compare the forecasting power of the
resulting events model and topic model when forecasting onset. The list of
event counts, blue solid line, can predict civil war onset fairly well and even
performs slightly better than the topic model for small false negative rates. Our
news model performs better for most values and in particular when predicting
armed conflict onset. When predicting incidence there is no clear dominance of
either the topic or the events model, shown in Figure B.10 and Figure B.11.
Moreover, we test our predictive power concerning refugees, an outcome
which is closely related to violence and reported by the UNHCR. We use this
data to construct the total number of refugees who have left their country of
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Figure B.6: ROC Curves for Onset (Two Years Before Conflict)
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Notes: The curves are based on the results of the topic model computed using LDA with
α = 3.1 and β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is
the complete model net of country fixed effects.
origin. In light of the discussion of news biases this data has the advantage that
it is collected using registers, surveys, registration processes and censuses.
The number of refugees is almost uniformly distributed from 1 to several
million, which makes the choice of the right cutoff difficult. We, therefore, take
an agnostic approach and define two cutoffs so that we get ten percent and five
percent of country/years with a number of refugees above the threshold. This
gives us cutoffs of 30,000 and 130,000 refugees. The resulting dummy variables
have frequencies comparable to armed conflict and civil war.
We then use our topic model to test whether we can predict whether a
large number of refugees will leave the country in the next year. In panel a)
of Figure B.12, we show that the onset of more than 130,000 refugees can be
predicted somewhat with our model. In panel b) we predict the onset of 30,000
refugees and results are very similar. What is striking here is that the overall
and within models perform very similarly, with the within model sometimes
exceeding the relatively weak predictive power of the complete model. This is
important as refugee numbers are often reported by local aid agencies and not
by news agencies. News are therefore able to forecast events, which are not
mainly collected by news sources (as most of the violence is).
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Figure B.7: ROC Curves for Onset (Other Conflicts)
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Notes: The curves are based on the results of the topic model computed using LDA with
α = 3.1 and β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is
the complete model net of country fixed effects.
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Figure B.8: ROC Curves for Onset (Conflict in Per Capita Terms)
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Notes: The curves are based on the results of the topic model computed using LDA with
α = 3.1 and β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is
the complete model net of country fixed effects.
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Figure B.9: ROC Curves for Repression
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Notes: The curves are based on the results of the topic model computed using LDA with
α = 3.1 and β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is
the complete model net of country fixed effects.
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Figure B.10: ROC Curves for Onset Focusing on Within Variation (Events vs
Topic Model)
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Notes: The event model is based on ICEWS, as described in Ward et al. (2013), which uses
event data generated from news. The topic model is based on 15 topics computed using LDA
with α = 3.1 and β = 0.01. The within model is the complete model net of country fixed
effects.
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Figure B.11: ROC Curves for Incidence Focusing on Within Variation (Events
vs Topic Model)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
False Positive Rate
a) Civil War (within)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
False Positive Rate
b) Armed Conflict (within)
Events Topic model
Notes: The event model is based on ICEWS, as described in Ward et al. (2013), which uses
event data generated from news. The topic model is based on 15 topics computed using LDA
with α = 3.1 and β = 0.01. The within model is the complete model net of country fixed
effects.
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Figure B.12: ROC Curves for Refugee Flows
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Notes: The curves are based on the results of the topic model computed using LDA with
α = 3.1 and β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is
the complete model net of country fixed effects.
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C Additional Figures
Figure C.1: ROC Curves for Incidence
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Notes: The topic model is based 15 topics computed using LDA with α = 3.1 and β = 0.01,
which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is the complete model net
of country fixed effects.
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Figure C.2: Precision Recall Curves for Incidence
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
ec
is
io
n
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
True Positive Rate
a) Civil War
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
ec
is
io
n
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
True Positive Rate
b) Armed Conflict
Overall model Within model
Notes: The curves are based on the results of the topic model computed using LDA with
α = 3.1 and β = 0.01, which are aggregated at the country/year level. The within model is
the complete model net of country fixed effects.
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Figure C.3: Topic Shares of Industry and Tourism in the Universe of Articles
when Risk Is High vs Low
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Notes: Shares represent average topic shares of all articles (not aggregated at the country/year
level). High risk is defined as a predicted probability of onset above five percent.
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